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FOREWORD
Scholarship and Legal Education
DONALD J. POLDEN*

I appreciate the opportunity to introduce volume twenty-four of
the Memphis State University Law Review. I would like to preface
the volume by discussing a topic of current significance to legal
education and to law reviews. This also permits me to articulate
some general views about the relevance and importance of research
and scholarship in legal education. This description requires, in the
first instance, a brief development of current perspectives on the role
of scholarship in legal education and an identification of the tensions
that characterize academic discourse about the roles of scholarship.
Then, I offer some general views on a comprehensive model of
research and scholarship and describe its applicability to the functions
of law schools and the purposes of legal education.
The topic of scholarship in legal education has generated
considerable interest, controversy and scholarship of its own.' The
principal areas of discussion concern appropriate forms or types of
scholarship and the proper purposes of legal scholarship. In
significant part, current legal scholarship tends to be doctrinal or
theoretical. Professor (now Judge) Richard Posner has further defined
these general forms of scholarship as consisting of doctrinal analysis,
positive analysis using social science methods, and normative
analysis.' Posner recognized the tension within the legal academy
* Dean and Professor of Law, Cecil C. Humphreys School of Law, Memphis State
University.
1. See, e.g., John Elson, The Case Against Legal Scholarship or, If the Professor
Must Publish, Must the Profession Perish?, 39 J. LEGAL EDuc. 343 (1989); Mary Kane,
Some Thoughts on Scholarship for Beginning Teacher, 37 J. LEGAL EDuc. 14 (1987);
Richard Posner, The Present Situation in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1113 (1981);
Anthony Kronman, Legal Scholarship and Moral Education, 90 YALE L.J. 955 (1981).
2.
Posner, supra note 1. According to Posner, doctrinal analysis "involves the careful
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concerning appropriate forms of legal scholarship, particularly the
primacy of theoretical scholarship over doctrinal analysis. He argued
that law schools should be more accepting of doctrinal analysis while
fostering interdisciplinary research and analysis.3 This tension
between forms of legal scholarship, some of which stems from
political or philosophical differences, appears in the scholarship
itself,4 or within the tenure, promotion and salary processes at
individual schools.
The tensions and institutional conflicts about the proper forms of
scholarship have raised concerns about the proper purposes of legal
scholarship. By some accounts, the purpose of legal scholarship is to
assist law teachers in their search for the truth and them in creating
in their students a desire to find truth.6 Other commentators have
argued that the process of legal scholarship merely fulfills the selfserving promotion of the scholar's financial success and professional
prestige.7 Still other writers have argued that scholarship serves not
only the individual scholar and her students, but also promotes
broader public objectives by relating the role of law to social needs.'

reading and comparison of appellate opinions with a view to identifying ambiguities,
exposing inconsistencies among cases and lines of cases, developing distinctions, reconciling
holdings, and otherwise exercising the characteristic skills of legal analysis." Id,at 1113. The
other major types of legal scholarship-positive analysis and normativism-stem from
relatively recent interest in interdisciplinary research and the application of social science
methods to legal problems. Id. at 1119-28. This new form of analysis, according to Posner,
has two parts, the positive, which attempts to understand legal phenomena, and normative
analysis, which attempts to prescribe and reform the law. Id. at 1119.
3.
Id. at 1129.
4. See, e.g., Mark V. Tushnet, Dia-Tribe, 78 MICH. L. REv. 694 (1980) (book
review).
5.
See Bruce Ackerman, The Marketplace of Ideas, 90 YALE L.J. 1131, 1135-41
(1981). See also Kane, supra note 1, at 14-19 for a discussion of the political and personal
differences may shape the reception of a piece of scholarship by colleagues.
6.
See Kronman, supra note 1, at 967. Kronman argues, from a communitarian
perspective, that law teachers must prevent their students from developing a "cynical
carelessness about the truth" which can undermine the "important good of community." I&a
Legal scholarship and the way it is brought into the classroom, according to Kronman, is an
important way that teachers can combat the cynicism of their students about the tasks of
lawyering. Id. He contends that the role of scholarship is more than merely reporting on
what a teacher has discovered, but rather it should be viewed "as a type of comportment, a
way of presenting oneself as a bearer of distinct values." Id.
7.
See Ackerman, supra note 5, at 1132-34.
8.
Michael Graetz & Charles Whitebread, Monrad Paulsen and the Idea of a
University Law School, 67 VA. L. REV. 445, 454 (1981) ("A university law school is among
the few institutions for anticipating future social needs and for relating the role of law to
furthering those needs. It must produce lawyers for tomorrow.")
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Recently, other legal academics, such as John Elson claim that
legal scholarship is commonly recognized as a preeminent value in
legal education, but assail its status arguing that it impedes the
development of lawyering competencies in law schools.9 These
academics premise their argument that legal scholarship diverts
teachers from their real responsibilities on the perception that teachers
do not develop lawyering competencies in the classroom because they
are preoccupied by scholarship enterprises.'"
Professor Elson's attack on the role of legal scholarship as an
essential part of legal education expresses some political or
philosophical disagreements. Specifically, Elson disagreed with the
notion that traditional forms of research and scholarship shape and
determine the hierarchy of work performed by law teachers and
articulates a concern that the ordering of that work impedes the
primary mission of educating law students for the practice of law.
Besises political concerns, his argument clearly focuses on the narrow
construction given by some law school administrators and legal
academics on what constitutes acts of scholarship. Moreover, it
requires consideration of the role that traditional legal scholarship
should play in the overriding mission of the law school.
The issues of defining and valuing the typology of scholarship is
not specific to the legal academy; indeed, these are issues that
interest many disciplines. In 1990, a special report on academic
scholarship authored by Ernest Boyer of the Carnegie Foundation
argued for a broader description of scholarship and for university
academics to accept a comprehensive model of their varied research

9.
See Elson, supra note 1, at 355.
10.
Id at 355-56. Professor Elson argues:
Because their primary attention is devoted to individual scholarly pursuits,
teachers have little time and energy for collaborating with the rest of the
faculty on the research, development and evaluation of a curriculum that is
capable of meeting students' professional needs. In addition, the desire or
pressure for scholarly production causes most law teachers to avoid the world
of practice. They thereby deny themselves access to knowledge that is critical
to developing and maintaining effective approaches to the teaching of
professional competence. Finally, because their most serious and sustained
thinking is devoted to their research on matter of complex theory, faculty are
likely to teach in ways and on subjects that are most compatible with their
scholarly concerns. As a result, classroom discussions devoted to neutral
doctrinal analysis and abstract theory displace the role-oriented, practicegrounded teaching that best develops the habits of mind necessary for
professional competence.
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and scholarly interests." The types of scholarship acknowledged in
the model are scholarship of discovery, the scholarship of integration,
the scholarship of application and the scholarship of teaching.'2 The
traditional -research activity, characterized as the search for knowledge
for its own sake, connotes the scholarship of discovery, arid this
activity is well known and honored at most academic institutions. 3
The scholarship of integration fulfills the need of some scholars to
give meaning to, and to put into perspective, otherwise isolated facts
and events; it creates a sense of "connectedness" between and across
disciplines and areas of thought." The scholarship of application,
according to Professor Boyer, is a dynamic undertaking rooted in the
notion that new intellectual understandings can arise out of applying
a theory to a reality or a practice. 5 Finally, Boyer identifies a
scholarship of teaching, which represents the process of acquiring
knowledge of material, developing a pedagogical strategy,
communicating material so that effective learning occurs, and
evaluating the teaching and learning that occurs in the classroom. 6
The scholarship paradigm offered by Boyer imports a greater
sense of coherence to the purposes and roles of research and
scholarship in legal education. Moreover, the breadth of the model
acknowledges the contributions made by many legal educators to the
development of lawyering competencies and professional skills.'7
This refreshing view acknowledges the integrity and importance of

11.
ERNEST L.
PROFESSORIATE (1990).

BOYER,

SCHOLARSHIP

RECONSIDERED:

PRIORITIES

OF

THE

12.
Id. at 16.
13.
Id at 17.
Id. at 18-19.
14.
15.
Id at 23. This form of scholarship reflects the potential service to humanity that
can occur when scholarship addresses the "huge, almost intractable problems [which] call for
the skills and insights only the academy can provide." I&
16.
I at 23-5. Although not explicitly articulated as an aspect of the scholarship of
teaching, the need for the publication or other written or verbal manifestation of the learning
process appears necessary or, minimally, desirable. Without some extension or distribution of
the significant process to others, then it becomes impossible to distinguish the act of
teaching from the act of scholarship.
17.
The range and importance of the many lawyering competencies was recently
articulated in the TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE
GAP,

LEGAL EDUCATION AND

PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT-AN

EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM

5 (1992). The Report identifies a significant array of fundamental lawyering skills which
lawyers are expected to demonstrate in the modem practice of law, including the following:
problem solving, legal analysis and reasoning, legal research, factual investigation,
communication, counseling, negotiation, litigation and alternative dispute resolution procedures,
organization and management of legal work and recognizing and resolving ethical dilemmas.
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work that does not fit the traditional model of legal scholarship, yet
does not condemn all acts of scholarship as distracting educators
from their roles in preparing students for the practice of law. Rather,

the perspective recognizes that all rigorous, serious work that
promotes understanding of law and learning by students should be
considered scholarship and should be accepted for the value it
contributes to the educational and professional training missing at law
schools. However, recognition of this more comprehensive model of
legal research and scholarship will require institutional reflection and
discussion.
I hope that the pages of this law review, and others as well,
provide an instrument for the widespread dissemination of the many
forms of legal scholarship that informs the process of legal education
and prepares 'law students for the tasks they will encounter after law
school.
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